By Saul Molobi
Johannesburg — If there was a single word that defined this high-level China–Africa roundtable, it was action. Not slogans, not communiqués, but concrete steps to reshape the international order from the vantage point of the Global South.
Under the banner “China–Africa Actions in the Rise of the Global South”, scholars, lawmakers and industry leaders moved well beyond polite diplomatic language. They pressed hard on uncomfortable truths: Africa’s marginal voice in global governance, its chronic position as a raw-material exporter, rising debt, and even xenophobic attacks on Chinese nationals. At the same time, they outlined practical pathways—through human security, language justice, green energy, critical minerals, and trade reform—to turn China–Africa partnership into a genuine engine of Global South revitalisation.
FOCAC at 25: From Numbers to Narratives
The chair of the roundtable, Executive Director of the Institute of African Studies at Zhejiang Normal University, framed the discussion with a striking set of figures:
- When FOCAC (the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation) was launched in 2000, China–Africa trade sat at just over US$10 billion.
- By 2024, it had surged to nearly US$300 billion.
- China has been Africa’s largest trading partner for 16 consecutive years.
- Chinese investment stock in Africa has grown more than 80-fold in 15 years, from under US$500 million to over US$14 billion.
Behind those numbers, he said, is “the steadfast progress of three billion people working hand in hand.” He also recalled President Xi Jinping’s repeated engagement with African scholars and the launch of a book documenting China–Africa cooperation from 2000 to 2025.
But if the opening was celebratory, what followed was a deliberate shift: from trade tallies to power, voice and justice.
Human Security: Putting People Back at the Centre
An Egyptian scholar injected a powerful moral lens into the conversation: human security.
She reminded participants that the Global South now represents 85% of the world’s population and close to 40% of global output, yet remains the epicentre of insecurity:
- From 1970 to 2021, the world witnessed more than 214 000 terrorist incidents, averaging one every two hours.
- The overwhelming majority occurred in the Global South, many in Africa.
- Add to this climate change, food insecurity, forced migration and collapsing livelihoods.
Once hailed as a breakthrough concept, “human security”, she argued, is losing ground both in theory and practice. States revert to traditional, militarised security while ordinary people experience unprecedented stress.
Her proposal was unambiguous:
China–Africa cooperation should revive human security as a core principle of South–South cooperation, and push it back onto the global agenda as a formal priority—anchored not in abstract doctrine, but in joint China–Africa initiatives that put people’s safety and dignity at the top of the 21st-century security agenda.
Swahili, Epistemic Justice and the Politics of Voice
From guns and borders, the conversation turned to language and knowledge—and it became clear why this matters politically.
Tanzanian scholar and Swahili expert Prof. Aldin Mtenje argued that the Global South has been “speaking with a borrowed tongue” for far too long. Knowledge and policy transfer, he noted, still takes place mainly in English, French and Portuguese, leaving millions effectively excluded.
He offered three concrete interventions:
- Document real South–South histories
He highlighted a book project on 100 years of Tanzania–China relations, designed to record how Tanzanians experienced China, and vice versa, over a century. It’s not just history, he said, but a way to let Southern voices narrate South–South ties. - Use African languages as strategic tools—not decorative add-ons
With UNESCO recently recognising Kiswahili as a working language, he argued that African languages must be integrated into:
- training materials,
- vocational education,
- agricultural extension,
- and technical cooperation programmes funded or supported by China.
This is epistemic justice: recognising Global South knowledge as equal to that of the North.
- Flip the teaching model: Swahili through African languages, not colonial ones
Instead of teaching Swahili via English or French, he proposed teaching it through Yoruba, Hausa, Shona, Amharic, Tigrinya, Lingala, and others:
- This simultaneously strengthens multiple African languages,
- encourages cross-pollination of philosophies and worldviews, and
- lays a linguistic foundation for Africa to speak more coherently in platforms like the AU, G20, UN and AfCFTA.
“Ignoring African languages,” he warned, “risks a new form of dependence: infrastructure grows, but local knowledge and broad-based inclusion are left behind.”
It was a forceful reminder that if the Global South wants a new global conversation, it cannot rely forever on someone else’s vocabulary.
Climate, Critical Minerals and the Risk of Green-Washed Extraction
A South African academic picked up another uncomfortable thread: the danger of repeating old extractive patterns under the banner of the green transition.
Africa, he said, is the “biggest inhabitant of what we now call critical minerals” — from chrome to cobalt and lithium. Yet in many cases:
- These resources are still exported as raw materials,
- With minimal local value addition,
- Leaving Africa once again with the lowest rung of the value chain.
The global climate agenda, he argued, is a double-edged sword. It could either lock Africa more deeply into primary extraction, or become a lever for industrialisation and manufacturing—if African states and their partners, including China, get the strategy right.
His prescription:
- Use climate and critical minerals to push for local processing,
- Build domestic manufacturing capacity,
- Structure cooperation with China around technology transfer, skills development and industrial base-building, not just mine-to-ship logistics.
Here, the Global South is not just asking for a “fair price” but a different position in the global value chain—from exporter of rocks to producer of technology and finished goods.
Green Energy: From EPC Contracts to “Small is Beautiful”
Energy transition emerged as another major axis of action.
Dr. Shu from Zhejiang Normal University outlined how FOCAC’s 2021 climate declaration has become a framework for China–Africa collaboration on green energy:
- China is now the world’s largest investor in green energy.
- An estimated 43% of its global green-energy investment is directed to Africa.
- Around 7% of its total energy investment in Africa is already in renewables.
But he acknowledged the skew:
- 93% of Chinese green energy investment in Africa still goes to hydropower.
- Wind and solar account for just 3% and 2% respectively, despite Africa’s vast potential.
The cooperation model is evolving, he said, from pure EPC (engineering–procurement–construction) contracts to public–private partnerships and a philosophy he called “Small is Beautiful”:
- Smaller, more localised, people-centred projects;
- More sustainable financing structures;
- Greater local ownership and risk-sharing;
- Faster, more visible benefits for communities.
He cited the Longyuan–Mulilo wind farm in South Africa as a flagship example of Chinese involvement not only in building but also investing in and operating green infrastructure.
The message was clear: for Africa, clean, reliable energy is the bedrock of everything else – industrialisation, health, education, mobility. The question is no longer whether China will invest, but how.
A Company’s View: “Lighting Up Africa” and the Politics of Perception
Bringing a corporate voice into the room, a representative from Sany, a Hunan-based heavy equipment and green energy company, offered a blunt counter-narrative to the “China is here only for resources” trope.
Sany, he said:
- Has been present in Africa for over 23 years;
- Has already invested more than 200 million RMB, with plans to reach 10 billion RMB in green energy alone;
- Employs over 1 000 Africans across its African operations.
“We want to light up Africa,” he said simply, “and walk this road together.”
He urged African media and policymakers to “give voice to the full story”—that China also brings:
- Technology,
- Management systems,
- Training and jobs,
- Long-term commitments to energy and industrial infrastructure.
It was as much a plea for perception fairness as it was a business pitch.
Trade Deficits and the Trap of Raw Exports
The issue of trade imbalance surfaced repeatedly.
A South African legal and policy adviser laid out a worrying pattern:
- In 2024, China accounted for roughly 23% of Africa’s trade, but close to 63% of its trade deficit.
- For South Africa specifically, a large portion of imports come from China, but less than 20% of exports go the other way.
Her diagnosis echoed long-standing critiques:
- Africa exports too many raw commodities,
- Imports too many finished products,
- And leaves most of the value—as well as most of the jobs—outside the continent.
Her solution was unapologetically practical:
- No more exporting diamonds, metals or agricultural goods in purely raw form.
- Cutting, polishing, processing and packaging should be done inside the producing African countries.
- Only then will tariff-free access to China—already granted to 53 African states—translate into developmental gains, not just higher volumes of low-value exports.
She highlighted a new stone-fruit agreement between South Africa and China as a case study of how smart sectoral deals can unlock hundreds of millions of rand in value when paired with technology, standards and market access.
Xenophobia, Solidarity and the Human Side of Cooperation
Perhaps the most emotionally charged intervention came from young speaker Jesse Wilson, who chose to talk about something many prefer to avoid: xenophobic attacks on Chinese nationals in some African countries.
He reminded the room that:
- Many Chinese citizens come to Africa with the same hopes Africans carry to China: to learn, to work, to build businesses, to transform their lives.
- Yet recent headlines show cases where Chinese-owned businesses were looted, investments torched, and citizens evacuated under threat.
“How,” he asked bluntly, “can we speak of a shared future if those we call partners do not feel safe among us?”
He insisted that:
- Africa must match its acceptance of Chinese capital with genuine protection for Chinese people,
- Just as Chinese cities host thousands of Africans building businesses and communities with relatively little disruption.
His message was not to excuse legitimate grievances about labour practices or unfair deals, but to argue that violence destroys not only lives, but also trust and livelihoods, and risks undoing decades of goodwill.
“Africa is our motherland,” he said in closing, “and China is family. One country’s success is the opportunity for the other.”
UN Security Council Reform, Debt and Capacity: The Long Game
The roundtable ended on a sober geopolitical note from a Malawian Member of Parliament.
He revisited the Ezulwini Consensus of 2005, which demands:
- Two permanent African seats on the UN Security Council;
- Five non-permanent seats for Africa.
From Robert Mugabe to William Ruto, African leaders have repeated this call. Yet progress remains elusive.
He proposed that:
- China, as a permanent member of the Security Council, has both the influence and responsibility to support African claims;
- Scholars and think tanks must develop new strategies to push the reform agenda within the broader Global South.
On the economic front, he flagged rising debt levels as a major threat:
- Without debt restructuring, many African states will be unable to invest meaningfully in health, education and social services.
- China and other Global South partners should explore cooperative approaches that combine fiscal breathing space with stronger accountability.
He returned, too, to the trade deficit and the need for processing plants in Africa:
- If Chinese investment in mining is complemented by local refineries and processing facilities, Africa can capture more revenue and narrow the gap.
The session chair picked up on this, emphasising that capacity and resilience are the true currencies of international influence:
“Talk is cheap. You can make the finest speech at the UN, but if you lack domestic capacity, nobody is compelled to listen.”
China, he noted, became a major global voice only after decades of intensive domestic capacity-building. Africa, he implied, must do the same if it wants its demands on reform and representation to carry real weight.
Editorial Bottom Line: From Shared Rhetoric to Shared Power
By the end of the day, the message from the roundtable was clear:
- The Global South is no longer asking to be recognised; it is asking to be re-equipped.
- Trade figures and mega-projects matter, but so do:
- the languages in which we teach and negotiate,
- the stories we tell and who tells them,
- the safety of Chinese shopkeepers in African streets,
- and the ability of African states to move from exporting ore to exporting ideas and finished products.
China–Africa cooperation, the speakers suggested, is standing at a crossroads. It can either reproduce the old patterns of dependency—this time under a different flag—or become the laboratory in which a new, fairer global order is quietly built.
The difference will not lie in how many declarations are signed, but in how courageously both sides act on the agenda they have now articulated: human security, language justice, industrialisation, clean energy, narrative sovereignty and shared responsibility.
If those priorities move from panel notes into policy, then “China–Africa actions for the rise of the Global South” will be more than a conference title. It will be the first draft of a new chapter in world history.