When it comes to rivalry between the BRICS members, the focus is usually on India and China. Besides a 1996 agreement between the neighbours prohibited the use of guns and explosives along the disputed western Himalayan border area, troops from the two countries occasionally exchange fire. For example, a military standoff in January 2021 resulted in injuries to soldiers on both sides. It occurred near India’s Sikkim state, which is located between Bhutan and Nepal. Tensions between India and China worsened after a deadly Aksai Chin-Ladakh clash in 2020 and a brawl at India’s north-easternterritory of Arunachal Pradesh in December 2022.
While Beijing and New Delhi reportedly committed to intensifying efforts to de-escalate tensions at their contested border, it is reported that the tensions endure in BRICS. However, there has been little focus on Russia and China, who always present a united front in BRICS and on other international platforms. despite their historical incompatibilities. This unity can be attributed to various factors, including shared geopolitical interests and a desire to counterbalance the influence of Western powers in international affairs.
Both countries are concerned by the threat posed by the US and its NATO alliances to their geopolitical interests. Their relationship has grown into something akin to a military alliance. They also demonstrate high levels of dependency, especially following the Ukraine conflict. China increased its purchases of Russian energy by 60% since 2022, and this provided Russia with much-needed cash to help it weather the economic sanctions imposed by the West and to fund its military operations in Ukraine.
However, the point that often escapes analysts and scholars is that the two countries have varied and conflicting histories. Russia’s history as a civilisational force in the eastern part of Eurasia has left a legacy of mistrust and resentment in Asia. On the other hand, China is still bitter about the colonisation it experienced at the hands of foreign powers during the century of humiliation, namely the 110 years between 1839 and 1949 when China was weak, divided and fragmented.Robert Bickers argues that foreign powers did not only include Britain, France and Japan but also Russia.
This opinion piece explores the future of BRICS through the historical lens by examining Russia’s imperial past and possible Chinese revanchism.
□ The unlikely alliance between a coloniser and a colony – the present
Besides the common geopolitical interests, the closeness between China and Russia is symbiotic and beneficial to both sides. China has a large population and a capital-rich economy that is comparable to the US in terms of purchasing power parity. However, the Asian country has very few natural resources, such as natural gas, oil and minerals. Therefore, this means that China must import most of these resources from abroad, which makes it vulnerable to the US and other members of the Quad.
Russia, on the other hand, has a small economy and very little capital. But, it has a vast supply of the natural resources that China desperately needs. Russia has the largest reserves of natural gas on the planet, as well as large reserves of oil and coal. It also has significant quantities of valuable minerals including copper, lead, diamonds and nickel. Most of these resources are located in the vicinity of Siberia, which is relatively close to China’s industrial base.
If left to their own devices, the Russians would not be able to exploit these resources because they lack the capital and population base. That is where Beijing comes in. China can provide Russia with the capital it needs to continue pushing back against American hegemony in Eastern Europe and expanding its strategic depth of control across the Eurasian steppe. Moscow can then provide Beijing with the natural resources it needs to reduce its dependence on imports from the Middle East and the Strait of Malacca, one of the most important and busiest shipping lanes in the world.This gives China more strategic flexibility in the Indo-Pacific.
□ Salient points in the coloniser-colony relationship
In the recent period, China and the Soviet Unionhad different tensions over their different interpretations of Marxism and this caused their relationship to deteriorate in the 1960s. Soviets were known for not tolerating decent in its communist flank. In 1968, for instance, they invaded Czechoslovakia to put down a revolt and later issued the Brezhnev Doctrine. This doctrine basically declared that the Soviet Union had the right to intervene in any socialist country that was deemed to be deviating from the communist path.
Under Mao Zedong, Beijing interpreted the Brezhnev Doctrine as an ideological justification for the Soviets to invade China and overthrow theChinese Communist Party (CCP). The tensions resuscitated China’s bitterness over the loss of the Qing Empire’s north-eastern province of Manchuria to Russia in 1858. Manchuria historically refers to modern-day Russian areas of Primorsky Krai, southern Khabarovsk Krai, the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, the Amur Oblast and the island of Sakhalin. These events resulted in China losing access to the Sea of Japan.
At the height of the Sino-Soviet tensions, Mao allegedly made a private remark in 1964 to a visiting delegation from the Japanese Socialist Party that Russia had annexed Manchuria without China’s consent, and that the issue was still unresolved. His remarks were leaked to the public and caused outrage in Moscow. Looking at how both China and Russia frequent historical records to make territorial claims, respectively in Taiwan and Ukraine, it cannot be ruled out that the Manchuria question will be buried forever as it happened in the 1960s.
To counter the Brezhnev Doctrine, Chinastrategically ignited a border conflict with the Soviet Union in the area bordering Manchuria. The Amur and Ussuri rivers defined the border between the two countries but the Soviets claimed that all islands within the rivers belonged to them.China disagreed, arguing that the border ran through the midpoint of the rivers, meaning that islands on the Chinese side of that line belonged to China. This led to a fight in March 1969 over the Zhenbao or Damansky Island. The fighting lasted for weeks and dozens of soldiers were killed on both sides. This conflict almost came close to nuclear war.
The issue of the so-called unequal treaties, a series of treaties signed during the 19th and early 20th centuries between China and Western powers and Russia, refuses to die down among Chinese nationalists. In ‘The Rise of Modern China’ (1970), Immanuel Hsu argues that the treaties were unequal “because they were not negotiated by nations treating each other as equals but were imposed on China after a war, and because they encroached upon China’s sovereign rights … which reduced her to semi-colonial status”. This brief history contextualises deep-seated mistrust and suspicion between China and the Soviet Union.
□ Reversal of roles and the future of the Russo-China relationship
The Soviet Union’s support for the CCP in the Chinese Civil War helped the current ruling classin Beijing to come to power in 1949. However, so much has changed since then and the roles have now tremendously been reserved. Russia’s economy is much smaller than China’s and has far less capital. In 2023, the Russian economy is only about the size of China’s Guangdong Province.
Russia probably understands that it is now a junior partner and that it needs China for its long-term survival. Far and Central Asia could be a cause of friction between the allies due to China’s growing influence. But Russia is silently observing former Soviet Republics as they gravitate towards Beijing. It also waits for the day that Beijing would raise the Manchuria question to address some internal issues that could become problematic a few years down the line.
China is soon going to face several challenges that include its large population, water scarcity and heavy demands of a large economy. With about 20% of the world’s population, China has access to less than 10% of the world’s surface freshwater resources, the highest concentration in the south in the Himalayan regions of India, Nepal and Bhutan as well as in Tibet. The challenge is that this represents long distances to major urban centres like Beijing and Tianjin in the east. It is not a coincidence that China’s friction with India pertains to this region.
Given these circumstances, China’s water concerns seem to extend northward into the Russian Far East. Fortunately for China, the region harbours an enormous and relatively untapped reservoir of freshwater conveniently located near its borders: Lake Baikal, whichcontains more freshwater than all of the North American Great Lakes combined. The lake could provide China with a much-needed source of water but Russia is unlikely to give China free access to this large body of water.
Even with a revisionist leadership in future, Beijing is unlikely to militarily invade Russia’s far-eastern territories, in a conventional way at least. As a leading power, China understands that it needs allies in Russia and some countries in the BRICS bloc and beyond to maintain its eminent position in global affairs. Thus, China could invest in the region’s economy and flood cities like Irkutsk, Vladivostok and Khabarovsk with its population.
As of June 2023, Russia gave China access to the port of Vladivostok as a transit hub for its domestic trade supplies. Concerns about Chinese revanchism are still far-fetched at this point but Liu Mingfu claims that Beijing’s “grand goal” is to restore China to its historical glory and take the United States’ place as world leader.Contemporary geostrategic considerations will inform the Russo-China relations well into the future. That is the reason both countries have a vested in the success of BRICS.