The middle class occupies a distinctive and often underestimated position within political systems. While
political and economic discourse frequently focuses on the polarities of capital owners and the working
poor, the middle class functions as the connective tissue between them.
This essay explores its economic, political, cultural, and historical functions, with specific attention to the
formation of the middle class in South Africa: its first creation under colonialism, its suppression and
resistance under apartheid, its expansion through entrepreneurship, its role in post-1994 state-building,
and its position within the contemporary “two economies” debate.
MIDDLE CLASS FUNCTION
ECONOMIC: CONSUMPTION, PRODUCTION, AND FISCAL CONTRIBUTION
Economically, the middle class serves as both producer and consumer.
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Its members supply skilled and professional labour – educators, engineers, nurses, accountants,
managers – whose expertise increases productivity and innovation. At the same time, their disposable
income sustains mass consumption. Because they earn above subsistence but below wealth-
accumulation levels, middle-class households spend a high proportion of income on goods, services,
housing, and education. This consumption drives demand, incentivises investment, and supports small
and medium enterprises.
Fiscally, the middle class constitutes the most reliable tax base in most capitalist states. Earning formal,
documented incomes, its members contribute substantially to personal income tax and value-added tax.
In South Africa, a small percentage of taxpayers in the middle and upper-middle brackets contribute the
majority of personal income tax revenue. This revenue underwrites public infrastructure, education, and
health systems that benefit the entire population.
POLITICAL FUNCTION: STABILITY, MEDITATION AND DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION
Politically, the middle class acts as a stabilising force.
Possessing assets, qualifications, and expectations of upward mobility, it has a vested interest in
institutional continuity, property rights, and the rule of law. This reduces the likelihood of revolutionary
upheaval while increasing demand for accountable governance.
The middle class also mediates between state and capital, and between elite and mass politics. Through
professional associations, trade unions for skilled workers, civil society organisations, and electoral
participation, it articulates policy demands and monitors state performance. Its members are more likely
to be informed, organised, and capable of collective action, which strengthens democratic institutions
even when it challenges specific governments.
CULTURAL AND SOCIAL FUNCTION: NORMS, MOBILITY AND KNOWLEDGE
Culturally, the middle class transmits norms essential to capitalist development: literacy, punctuality,
delayed gratification, and investment in education. By prioritising schooling and skills acquisition for their
children, middle-class families reproduce human capital across generations.
Socially, it embodies the principle of mobility that legitimises capitalism. The possibility that individuals
can move into the middle class through education and work sustains belief in merit and opportunity. When
this mobility stalls, as it has for many in post-1994 South Africa, the legitimacy of the system is called into
question.
HISTORICAL FUNCTION: FIRST CREATION OF THE MIDDLE CLASS IN SOUTH AFRICA
To understand the role of the middle class in contemporary South Africa, it is necessary to examine its
earliest formation.
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The “first creation” of a South African middle class was not a single event but a racially bifurcated process
shaped by colonial capitalism, segregation laws, and state policy. It occurred in two distinct streams: a
white middle class created by the state, and a black middle class that emerged despite the state.
The White Middle Class: A State-Made Stratum, c. 1910–1948
The first large-scale, institutionally secured middle class in South Africa was white.
Its creation was directly engineered by the Union of South Afric government after 1910. Job reservation,
the “civilised labour policy”, and the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 reserved skilled, supervisory, and
clerical work for white workers. This artificially elevated wages and created a stratum of artisans, foremen,
clerks, teachers, and civil servants with incomes and job security far above black workers.
The post-Union state expanded rapidly, absorbing thousands of white workers into permanent,
pensionable employment in railways, the Post Office, education, and the police. Subsidised housing,
cheap credit through state-owned banks, and preferential access to land under the 1913 Natives Land
Act further insulated this group from market competition. The white middle class was thus not the product
of free-market accumulation alone, but of deliberate state intervention designed to ensure white social
stability. It became the social base of both Afrikaner and English political parties, and its interests aligned
with maintaining racial capitalism: a large, cheap black labour force and a protected white labour market.
The Black Middle Class: An Indigenous Formation Despite Exclusion, c. 1850–1948
While the state constructed a white middle class, a black middle class emerged organically through
mission education, commerce, and professional practice.
From the mid-19th century, mission schools in the Eastern Cape, Natal, and the Transvaal produced the
Amakholwa or “believers” who were literate in English and African languages. They became Educators,
interpreters, clerks, and early journalists. Institutions like Lovedale and Fort Hare trained the first
generation of black doctors, lawyers, and clergy. Their income and status placed them above the
peasantry and working class, though always below white professionals.
In urban areas and freehold locations such as Sophiatown, black property owners, traders, and transport
operators accumulated capital. The 1913 Land Act severely restricted this, but did not eliminate it. The
black bourgeoisie ran shebeens, shops, and transport services, and invested in education as the main
vehicle for mobility. This early black middle class founded the African National Congress in 1912. Figures
like Pixley ka Isaka Seme, John Dube, and Charlotte Maxeke articulated politics of petition and gradual
inclusion. Their class position gave them resources and literacy to organise, but also placed them in
tension with both the white state and the black working class.
First Creation of the Middle Class in South Africa Facilitated Division
The first creation of the South African middle class therefore produced a divided social structure from the
outset.
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One segment was created by the state through racial preference; the other emerged in spite of the state
through education and entrepreneurship. This duality explains a persistent feature of South African
politics: debates about the middle class are always also debates about race, state policy, and access.
The contemporary black middle class is not entirely new; it is an expansion of the Amakholwa tradition,
now operating within institutions originally built for a white middle class.
HISTORICAL FUNCTION: THE MIDDLE CLASS FORWARD VS APARTHEID
Suppression and Resistance, 1948–1994
Under apartheid, racial laws deliberately intensified the exclusion of black South Africans from property,
quality education, and professional advancement. The state’s objective was to maintain a racialised
labour system without a politically empowered black middle stratum.
Despite these constraints, the black middle class—teachers, clergy, nurses, lawyers, journalists, and
small business owners—became a central feature of resistance. It possessed educational capital, relative
economic independence, and moral authority that contradicted apartheid ideology. It formed the
backbone of the ANC, civic organisations, and legal challenges. The apartheid state recognised this
threat and intensified policies to retard black middle-class formation, understanding that demands for
rights would follow the acquisition of education, property, and professional status.
The role of the Taxi Industry In Maintaining a Black Middle Class
A distinct vector of black middle-class formation under apartheid was the minibus taxi industry. Excluded
from formal business ownership and professional employment, many black entrepreneurs turned to
transport as a space of economic opportunity.
The taxi industry developed in response to state failure. Apartheid urban planning located black townships
far from economic centres with inadequate state transport. Black operators purchased minibuses and
provided the service the state would not. This enabled capital accumulation outside formal employment,
economic autonomy from white employers, and organisational capacity through taxi associations. Post-
1994, the industry consolidated as the dominant form of public transport and a major site of black capital
formation, illustrating that middle-class emergence also occurred through entrepreneurship in the
informal economy.
The Role Of The Black Middle Class in the Creation And Maintenance of Post-1994 South Africa
Following 1994, the black middle class assumed a dual role.
In creation, its entry into parliament, the civil service, judiciary, universities, and corporate boards
provided racial legitimacy to democratic institutions. Policies such as affirmative action and Black
Economic Empowerment accelerated this transition.
In maintenance, the black middle class became critical to state function. It constitutes the core of the
public service, sustains the tax base that funds social grants and infrastructure, and embodies the
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promise of upward mobility that legitimises democracy. Its position is, however, fragile due to “black tax”,
dependence on public sector employment, and exposure to institutional decline.
STRUCTURAL FRAGILITY AND THE TWO STATES ECONOMY DEBATE
Since former President Thabo Mbeki’s 2003 address to Parliament, South Africa has been characterised
as possessing “two economies”: a formal, globally integrated, capital-intensive first economy, and a
marginalised, labour-absorbing second economy characterised by poverty and underdevelopment.
Proponents argue that this describes a racialised structure inherited from apartheid. The first economy
remains concentrated and historically white-dominated, while the second economy absorbs the majority
of black workers excluded from formal labour markets. In this view, the black middle class is thin and
precarious because it is trapped between the two.
Critics contend that “two economies” is a misleading metaphor. South Africa has one highly unequal,
integrated economy. The formal and informal sectors are linked through supply chains, labour migration,
and household networks. The black middle class is the primary bridge: taxi owners purchase vehicles
from formal dealers and employ drivers from townships; professionals pay domestic workers and spaza
shops; “black tax” transfers income from the middle class to poor households.
For the black middle class, the two economies framing creates both opportunity and burden. Opportunity
lies in providing services that connect formal and informal markets. Burden lies in being expected to
subsidise the second economy through family support while also sustaining the tax base of the first
economy. This dual pressure explains much of the financial stress and political anxiety observed within
the post-1994 black middle class.
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: THE STATE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS ACROSS AFRICA
To evaluate South Africa’s trajectory, it is necessary to place it within the broader African context. The
African middle class has grown rapidly since 2000, but its size, composition, and political role differ
substantially across states. Three patterns are observable.
DEFINITIONAL MEASUREMENT CHALLENGES
There is no single definition of “middle class” in African economies.
The African Development Bank defines it as individuals spending $2-$20 per day in 2005 PPP terms, a
range that includes many vulnerable households. More restrictive definitions use $10-$100 per day, which
captures households with discretionary income and asset ownership.
This definitional elasticity means estimates vary widely. Under the broader AfDB measure, Africa’s middle
class was 313 million people in 2010. Under stricter consumption-based measures, estimates fall to 50-
100 million. The exploratory implication is that much of Africa’s “middle class” remains economically
fragile, with limited savings and high exposure to shocks.
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REGIONAL VARIATION IN FORMATION
North and Coastal West Africa
Countries like Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Ghana, and Senegal developed relatively large middle classes
in the post-independence period through state employment, education expansion, and small trade. Their
middle classes historically provided the social base for nationalist movements and later for demands for
political liberalisation in the 1990s.
East Africa
Kenya and Uganda exhibit a middle class built around commerce, diaspora remittances, and the public
sector. Kenya’s middle class is politically vocal and has driven constitutional reforms and anti-corruption
campaigns. However, it remains small relative to population size and concentrated in Nairobi.
Southern Africa excluding South Africa:
Botswana created a middle class through diamond revenues and prudent state management, resulting
in high human development and a stable professional class. Zambia and Zimbabwe saw middle-class
contraction after economic crises, demonstrating the fragility of the stratum when dependent on a narrow
commodity base or hyperinflation.
Nigeria and Angola
Resource-dependent economies produced a consumption-oriented middle class linked to oil revenues.
This group is often urban, globally connected, but with limited productive capacity. Its political role is
constrained by patrimonialism and weak institutions.
Common Constraints Across the Continent
Despite diversity, three constraints recur:
➢ Informality and Vulnerability: A large proportion of Africa’s middle class operates in the informal
sector or as informal entrepreneurs. They lack formal pensions, insurance, and job security. The
COVID-19 pandemic reversed middle-class gains in several countries, pushing households back
into poverty.
➢ Dependence on the State: In many states, if not all in Africa, the public sector remains the primary
employer of the educated middle class. This creates a fiscal burden and aligns middle-class
interests with state stability, sometimes at the expense of critical citizenship.
➢ Limited Asset Base: Home ownership, equity markets, and pension coverage are less developed
than in OECD countries. African middle-class wealth is more often held in small businesses,
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vehicles, and land than in financial assets. This limits intergenerational transfer and makes the
class more vulnerable to economic shocks.
EXPLORATORY COMPARISON WITH SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa’s middle class is an outlier in Africa for three reasons.
First, it is larger in absolute terms and contributes a higher share of income tax revenue. Second, its
political role has been more direct: it staffed both the anti-apartheid movement and the post-1994 state.
Third, it is racially bifurcated in origin, a legacy few other African states share to the same degree.
However, South Africa shares the continent’s central dilemma: a middle class that is large enough to
sustain consumption and the tax base, but too small and too indebted to drive mass transformation. Like
Kenya, it has a vocal professional class. Like Botswana, it depends on state employment. Like Nigeria,
it faces inequality that limits the class’s legitimacy.
The comparative perspective therefore suggests that South Africa’s “two economies” problem is an acute
version of a broader African challenge: how to move from a narrow, vulnerable middle class to a mass
middle class capable of broadening economic participation.
CONCLUSION
The middle class in a capitalist state is not merely a statistical category between rich and poor. It is a
functional pillar. It provides skilled labour and mass consumption, stabilises politics through its stake in
institutions, transmits norms of productivity and education, and historically has been central to struggles
for inclusion and rights.
The South African experience demonstrates that middle-class formation is a political process. Its first
creation under colonialism was racially divided. Under apartheid, preventing black middle-class
emergence was a strategy of control, while its emergence—through professionals, civic leaders, and taxi
entrepreneurs—became a strategy of liberation. After 1994, the black middle class became central to the
creation and maintenance of the democratic state. Today, its position within the contested framework of
“two economies” will determine whether South Africa’s democracy remains stable and its capitalism
remains inclusive.
Placed in an African context, South Africa’s middle class is both exceptional and representative.
Exceptional in size and historical role. Representative in its fragility and dependence on state and formal
employment. The health of Africa’s middle classes will therefore shape the continent’s 21st-century
trajectory.
Where the middle class thrives, capitalism functions with broader participation. Where it collapses, both
prosperity and democracy get imperilled.